"The proliferation of hadiths spawned a parallel body of law, believed to be “equal” to the law based on revelation. The prophet tried to prevent the proliferation of traditions. But people proceeded to record and disseminate them regardless. The result was a parallel system of law. This requires attention. The elevation of hadiths to revelation suggests two Lawgivers. How are we to reconcile this with the teaching of tawhid? The elevation of tradition to revelation enabled the formulation of law based upon folklore, statements that are not admissible in law courts, let alone in Islamic law, which features stringent requirements of proof. For example, conviction of adultery requires four reliable witnesses. Yet problematic jurists accepted the testimony of an under-aged person as a basis for sentencing people to death for the alleged “crime” of apostasy, when apostasy is not a transgression punishable in this life according to revelation. Among the worst developments has to be the designation of the use of reason to understand revelation as a form of kufr. This was an assault on reason by persons steeped in mysticism and anti-rationalism. It paved the way for the emergence of Islamism, the remnants of which we see to this day in the actions of ISIS and their supporters. This assault on reason foreshadowed Nietzsche’s attack on rationalism a millennium afterwards. It followed the assault on the philosophers by Musa al-Hadi in 786.The characterization of the use of reason in the comprehension of revelation as kufr shows how far exegesis and jurisprudence atrophied from the early days. It also highlights the urgency of restructuring penal law. It is no wonder that not a few persons are drifting from Islam and those who wish to remain are asking for better methodology. (24 pages)

"Different factors were identified as causing the decline of the Islamic civilization. Perhaps a suitable way to answer this question is to ask what were the factors that led to the rise of the Islamic civilization, and then to argue that the withdrawal or change in these factors caused the decline. It is clear that the Muslim civilization rose on account of following revelation. To follow revelation, one must understand it. And to apply or follow revelation one must use one’s reason. Hence, the Muslim civilization declined when people no longer followed revelation but something else, tradition. They reduced following revelation because they could not understand it. And they could not understand it because they ceased using their reason. They ceased using their reason because they identified the use of reason with kufr and wanted to follow tradition. In other words, the Muslim civilization declined because its turned form revelation and started to follow tradition: “the Sunnah was viewed as the self-sufficient guidebook to Islamic life.” To justify this turn, they declared tradition to be revelation. But tradition is not revelation. And here is the tragic flaw that brough the Islamic civilization to its knees. It began following what Allah did not reveal. Hence, what is required is a return to revelation, the subordination of tradition to revelation and the rehabilitation of reason. (19 pages)

The prohibition of reasoning produced paralysis in Muslim thought. The paralysis resulted in aberrations in exegesis. These encompass assumptions that are at variance with reason. These include the assumptions that the use of reason in the elucidation of revelation is kufr, that revelation features “unclear” verses, and that tradition is revelation. Tradition took precedence in relation to revelation on the basis of the perception that “tradition judges revelation.” This rearrangement enabled rulings based on traditions, without basis in revelation, to be embedded in jurisprudence. These encompass the death penalties for adultery, blasphemy and apostasy. Rehabilitation of reasoning thus requires a recognition of the role of reason in comprehending both tradition and revelation, reinstating revelation to pre-eminence in relation to tradition, and a desacralization of tradition. This should assist in addressing aberrations produced by the subjugation of revelation to tradition. (8 pages)

Knowledge encompasses the knowledge of revelation. In the West, knowledge was affected by empiricism. In a defiance of the traditional perspective, the partisans of empiricism asserted that “seeing is believing.” If a thing may not be seen, empiricists argue, it does not exist. As God is nowhere be seen, according to empiricism, He does not exist. This is a flimsy epistemological basis for the knowledge of revelation. For they miss the fact that while God cannot be perceived by the five senses, the evidence of His existence is perceptible everywhere. The knowledge of revelation in Islam was tainted by problematic exegeses, traditional as well as political. Traditional exegesis produced “traditional Islam” while political exegesis produced “political Islam.” Traditional exegesis asserts that traditions are “equal” to revelation, while political exegesis teaches that the religion of peace evolved into a religion of war. Tradition takes it for granted that the prophetic traditions “judge,” “abrogate” and “replace” parts of revelation. Political exegesis endorses the perception that the ayah as-sayf (Quran, 9:5) “abrogated” verses that teach reconciliation. Traditional exegesis says that we have no freedom of the will. Allah predestines all acts. Political Islam teaches that we possess the ability to be better. Traditional exegesis teaches predestination, but political exegesis teaches activism. Traditional Islam teaches resignation to fate. Political Islam pursues “reform.” Belief in determinism perpetuates the status quo. It renders Muslims passive and “satisfied” with their “fate.” Predestination is irrational. How could God condemn His servants to hell after forcing them to transgress in the first place? The teaching of fatalism is a corruption of the teaching of Islam. Thus, there are problems with both traditional and political Islam. Neither reflects the pristine teaching of the Book of Allah reliably. For to assert that traditions are “equal” to revelation is to assert that the reports of the transmitters of traditions are “equal” to the words of God. And to assert that Allah abrogates His words is to ascribe imperfection – a personal trait – to Him. Moreover, to assert that there are six “supplementary” books of revelation is to suggest that the Book of Allah is imperfect and accordingly requires being “supplemented” and “clarified” by “additional” revelations, reported by persons. It is to assert that there are six “supplementary” providers of revelation. However, no person is able to reveal anything “equal” or “similar” to what Allah revealed. He reveals true religion. In time, tradition and politics eclipsed revelation. Naql (tradition) eclipsed ‘aql (intellect). Reason would be perceived as unsuitable for understanding revelation. This was remarkable, as all understanding requires the use of reason. To prohibit the use of reason problematic. It is to pave the road for the arrival of fanaticism. That revelation presents itself as “enlightenment” did not trouble the followers of tradition. Regrettably, the belittling of reasoning and the engagement of tradition to “explain” and “supplement” revelation did not enhance the knowledge of revelation. In fact, it made it harder to know and therefore to follow revelation. For it is not possible to follow what we do not understand. And it is not possible to know anything without the use of reason. To prohibit the use of reason is to block access to the knowledge of revelation. To prohibit access to knowledge is to prevent believers from following the teachings of Allah. Instead of enabling access to the knowledge of revelation, tradition presents itself as a “trustee” of revelation. The sharia emerged from traditions rather than revelation. To make matters worse, disparagement of reasoning enabled problematic practices to corrupt exegesis and, in that way, taint the knowledge of revelation. Unwarranted assumptions encompass the perception that the use of reason to explain revelation is kufr, that revelation is “unclear,” that revelation is “incomplete,” and that tradition is revelation. An example of a problematic practice is the teaching of abrogation.

"Much has been written about Islam in politics. Not much is written, however, about politics in Islam. What is axiomatic is that ruling elites “shape” knowledge to endorse their requirements, which is usually to maintain the status quo. Hence, the prohibition of private property was a feature of egalitarianism. The legalization of usury is a feature of the acquisitive nation. Efforts to “shape” knowledge is reflected in the experience of dissidents. In so far as they feel threatened by dissenting perceptions, elites tend to enforce a uniform worldview, lest “national unity,” or the “orthodoxy” could be in jeopardy. This is characteristic of egalitarianism, secularism or Islamism. However, as the experience of prophets also shows, dissenting perceptions at times do become the norm. The past confirms this. The French revolutionaries enforced the worldview of the Enlightenment through the Reign of Terror. Stalin enforced totalitarianism through purges and gulags. In Islam, Musa al-Hadi enforced tradition by murdering 5,000 thinkers in 786. Despotism enforces its worldview. Enforcement takes place through the use of brute force. Islam is presented as a religion that had an uninterrupted evolution, thus retaining its message in an uncorrupted form. The “classical tradition” is revered and presented as “authentic.” Yet an examination supplies a different perception. For two factors affected if not altered the knowledge of Islam: tradition and politics. Fazlur Rahman differentiated between ideal and actual Islam. For practice does not always reflect theory perfectly. The latter veered from the former. Islam did not remain static. The fitnahs of Islam testify to divisions. Two transformations are perceptible, triggered by disparate events. The first took place when tradition ¬– in preference to reason – was engaged to “explain” revelation. This required the downgrading of reason and the elevation of tradition to revelation. The designation of tradition as “revelation,” together with the ramifications of this event, transformed Islam into “traditional Islam.” The second transformation took place when the ayah as-sayf allegedly “abrogated” the peace verses. The abrogation of the peace verses, a massive tampering with the teaching of revelation, together with the emergence of bellicose traditions, transformed Islam into “political Islam.” It provided the justification for expansion, a precursor of “manifest destiny,” the perceived obligation to spread the benefits of Islam around the world, as “manifest destiny” required “spreading democracy” globally. The transformation facilitated the adoption of the separation of the world into the “abode of peace” and “the abode of war,” an early variant of the “clash of civilisations.” This provided justification for the expansion of the empire. But true Islam is neither traditional nor political. It is universal. True Islam is trans-national and non-sectarian. The engagement of tradition to “supplement” and “explain” revelation, moreover, contradicted the perception that revelation was perfect, as a perfect revelation would hardly require being “supplemented,” “explained,” and “abrogated.” The application of the theory of abrogation to revelation resulted in its restructuring with adverse results for the Muslim empire. The re-interpretation was facilitated by problematic folklore and the devaluation of reasoning. The wars of expansion were embarked upon in defiance of warning in revelation that “Allah does not love aggressors.” The politicization of revelation was a reflection of tribal tendencies that tainted the knowledge of revelation. Applying a predicate to Islam transforms its meaning. Thus, Islam differs from “political Islam.” Traditional Islam was formed by parochial tendencies. To recover universal Islam, it is necessary to free it of unwarranted accretions, assumptions as well as problematic practices pandering to the aspirations of the few. (16 pages)

Anti-rationalism in Islam is responsible for backwardness, corruption of knowledge and the fall of the Muslim empire. The West went through a Reformation and the Age of Reason. Islam also had an Age of Reason. However, it was short-lived, due to a backlash by tradition. Backwardness rendered Muslims vulnerable from without. The corruption of knowledge made the umma vulnerable from within. A “holier than thou” attitude brought backwardness. The perception that all effects are produced by Allah is worrying. It leaves no room for freedom of the will. Is it just for God to punish wrongdoers for what He “predestined” them to perform? The teaching of predestination denies a significant part of the teaching of revelation. The relationship between cause and effect is an essential part of the teaching Islam. By rejecting causality, Ghazali denied a significant part of the teaching of revelation. He turned people into machines. Predestination rests on the assumption that Allah rules without regard to justice. This is problematic. It makes God appear as a caliph. The teachers of predestination cast God in the image of their rulers. This was to pacify the masses and make them less prone to rebellion. It did not work. The assaults on reason began with assaults on freedom. Contrary to the teaching of revelation, unreason became a key part of the faith. The traditionists belittled and rejected reason in favor of tradition. To be a Muslim, people were expected to refrain from using reason, especially in religion. But the attainment of knowledge requires the utilization of reason. Mystics also did not appreciate reason. They prepared the way for saint-worship. Theologians steeped in traditions rejected reason to follow tradition. The rejection of reason enabled the treatment of tradition as "revelation" and in that way corrupted the knowledge of revelation. Mysticism teaches that revelation is “beyond reason.” Mysticism undermined rationalism in Islam and paved the way for the fall of the Muslim Empire. For it is not possible to succeed without following revelation. And it is not possible to follow revelation without understanding revelation. Neither is it possible to understand revelation without the use of reason. Countless Muslims recite revelation without comprehending it. The unwillingness to use reason to know revelation blocked access to the knowledge of revelation. Tainted knowledge of revelation facilitated the turn to tradition. However, traditions could not guide as well as revelation. Those that followed traditions began to fall into error. The empire fell due to the errors of its rulers. These comprised the killing of the Mongol traders and ambassadors by the Abbasids. This triggered the annihilation of the Abbasids. Errors also included the twin assaults on Vienna, which ended in defeat and the fall of the Turkish empire. The reorientation from revelation to tradition was justified by the assertion that the predecessors possessed “better” knowledge of revelation. Being around the prophet was taken as evidence of better knowledge of revelation. But not everyone around the prophet embraced or understood revelation and its teaching. Traditionists are prophet-oriented; the rationalists are Allah-oriented. Traditionists follow traditions; rationalists follow revelation. After a time, tensions emerged between the rationalists and the traditionists. These tensions took on political expressions. They culminated in the slaughter of 5,000 philosophers in 786, by Musa al-Hadi, during the Age of Tradition. This foreshadowed the Reign of Terror by Maximilien Robespierre in 1792, during the French Revolution, the so-called Age of Reason in Europe, by a millennium. Following tradition in preference to revelation amounted to a turning away from revelation to tradition. After the passing of the prophet, following traditions was associated with following the prophet. This signalled the rise of tradition.

"It has been said that Muslims are finding it difficult to “fit in.” One reason for this is that they follow tradition rather than revelation. Traditions change but principles do not. They designated tradition as revelation and even deem the prophetic traditions “equal” to revelation, even though revelation teaches that Allah has no “equals.” Problems facing Muslims encompass acts by wayward persons. These are due in part to a poor of knowledge of Islam. This is partly a result of a problematic rendering of revelation. Problematic rendering is a result of problematic exegesis. Problematic exegesis results from problematic assumptions in exegesis. The problem with the assumptions is that they have no basis in revelation. In a few cases, they defy the teaching of revelation. The problematic rendering of Islam was propelled by the effort to “bend” the teaching of revelation to endorse feudal regimes that emerged after the stewardship of the righteous caliphs. Problematic assumptions in exegesis caused exegetes to arrive at perceptions that differ from what revelations teaches. The reliance upon these assumptions tainted the knowledge of revelation. (11 pages)

"Militant jihadism has roots in the past. Its present-day manifestation is a result of a long process of modification of the teaching of Islam. For jihad entails the struggle for betterment (ethical jihad) and fighting in self-defense (defensive jihad). Jihad in the ethical sense is a quest for excellence. But it appears that tribal proclivities affected the meaning of the term. The meaning of jihad was affected by the elevation of tradition to revelation, the abrogation of the peace verses of revelation, and by the fabrication of traditions that endorse an aggressive rendition of revelation. Jihadists present a threat to public safety. For in his own eyes, the jihadist is judge, jury and executioner. This requires an enormous ego. Responses require effective enforcement. A long-term response, however, requires addressing the education of Muslims. This applies not just to what Muslims are taught but the way they are taught. For the present approach is flawed. There is not enough emphasis on reflection. There is too much memorization. There is excessive unquestioning following. This is a relic of the past, the heritage of shutting the gates to reasoning, taqlid and anti-rationalism. Hence, there are calls for renewal. The way we reflect requires reform. For knowledge of revelation has been affected by a problematic methodology, unwarranted assumptions and by the application of flawed theories. An example of a problematic methodology is taqlid, blind following of tradition. An example of an unwarranted assumption is the perception that revelation features “ambiguous” verses. An example of a flawed teaching is the theory of abrogation. While Islam may not be in crisis, there is a crisis in Islam, in the Muslim mind. For Muslims became enchanted by tradition to the extent they are willing to follow it even when it defies reason, not to mention revelation. This requires reflection. It requires rethinking tradition and its relationship to revelation. Renewal in addition requires a rehabilitation of reason and the reform of Muslim education. (27 pages)

"Much has been written about the reconciliation of reason and revelation. It is also necessary, however, to reconcile tradition and revelation, especially where tradition veers from revelation and provides a foundation of religion. For it appears that tradition veered from revelation. This is unsurprising. It would hardly be the first time it happened. There is no reason to assume that we always act the way we should. There is no guarantee that the Is always follows and reflects the Ought, that there will always be a harmony between obligation and inclination. For humans are wont to follow their desires. Practice does not always reflect theory. It is assumed that there could not be difference between revelation and tradition. In fact, an examination reveals that there is as much tension between revelation and tradition as between reason and revelation, if not more so. The tension is evident in the discrepancies between tradition and revelation. The denigration of reasoning and the designation of reason as kufr, enabled these distortions to go unnoticed. How did the tension between tradition and revelation arise? For it appears that “traditional” exegesis features aberrations. These aberrations take the form of punishments in penal law without a foundation in, and even in defiance of revelation. These are the penalties for blasphemy, apostasy and adultery. These punishments also make Islam appear extreme. They provide believers with reasons to want to dissociate from a religion that is perceived as cruel and unreasonable. Blasphemy is not a punishable offence in revelation, yet tradition prescribes the death penalty. Apostasy is not punishable in this life according to revelation, yet tradition prescribes the death penalty. Adultery – after a verdict reached using the testimony of four reliable witnesses – is punishable by lashing, but tradition prescribes stoning to death. These punishments are based on departures from revelation. But revelation warns against judging by what God did not reveal. Evidently, the rulings of persons were permitted to “abrogate” the rulings of God. This is problematic, as it flouts a basic requirement of exegesis and jurisprudence, which is that revelation is the chief authority, which is to be followed, not overruled. The abrogation of revelation by tradition flouts the sovereignty of Allah. What is required is a re-affirmation of the superiority of revelation in relation to tradition. This should assist in the rehabilitation of the penal code and the elimination of aberrant rulings caused by the abrogation of revelation by tradition. This should bring penal law into agreement with the teaching of revelation and address the perception that Islam is bent on punishing rather than dispensing reconciliation and mercy. (28 pages)

The relationship between reason and revelation has received attention. By contrast, the relationship between revelation and tradition has not received much attention. Tradition emerges from revelation. The prophetic traditions emerged well after the prophet. They were recorded and transmitted by persons who were not prophets. They are records of the acts of the prophet relayed by persons. The reports are paraphrases and not verbatim words of the prophet. As traditions are not the exact words of the prophet but rather paraphrases by transmitters, we could well wonder in what way any tradition could be considered “authentic.” Yet traditions were treated as binding legislation because they were treated as revelation. Revelation precedes tradition. It inaugurates tradition. It appears, however, that the relationship between tradition and revelation took on an unfamiliar expression. It appears that tradition “eclipsed” or “veiled” revelation. The eclipse of revelation by tradition is reflected in the perception that “tradition judges revelation.” It is also reflected in the axiom that “revelation needs tradition more than tradition needs revelation.” These expressions reflect a reversal of the relationship between tradition and revelation. An eclipse analogously transpires whenever tradition abrogates revelation. For tradition to abrogate revelation presupposes that tradition is capable of superseding revelation. The relationship between revelation and tradition requires attention. This is suggested by the perception that revelation and tradition are “equal” expressed in the perception that “tradition is a part of revelation.” Renewal requires resetting the relationship of revelation and tradition. It requires restoring revelation to its pre-eminence in relation to tradition. Tradition is better perceived as the actualization of revelation in practice rather than as its “judge” or “abrogator.” Renewal also requires the rehabilitation of reason. This requires the restoration of reason to its rank as the faculty of knowledge. For neither revelation nor tradition may be understood without recourse to, and utilization of reason. The disparagement of reasoning was a result of flawed reasoning, which assumed that attaining faith requires the sacrifice of reason upon the altar of tradition. The denigration of reason is reinforced by a “hadith that reportedly goes to the prophet, according to which he forbade the use of ‘reason-based tafsir’ as a form of disbelief (kufr).” (10 pages)