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2003 •
discusses how Chinese People's Liberation Army leaders and thinkers digested the lessons from their own military operations and incorporated them into contemporary military planning.
A reconsideration of traditionally skeptical attitudes about military transparency appears to be underway in China. Whereas Beijing formerly rejected Western calls for greater military transparency—arguing that transparency benefits the strong at the expense of the weak—a new calculus seems to be emerging that reflects China’s greater confidence in its own strength. As Chinese military capabilities have improved in both relative and absolute terms, the same logic that justified wariness of military transparency now recommends it as a useful tactic. Recent comments by Chinese officials and experts, along with some adjustments to military practice, suggest that greater transparency is now seen as an instrument capable of serving useful political and deterrent functions. China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
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